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There are two somewhat contrasting trends in today‟s world economy that have not 
been explained satisfactorily: First, despite growing exports and foreign direct 
investments (FDI; also in medium and high tech industries and services), many 
developing countries have grave difficulties in upgrading their economic structures 
and consequently experience stagnating real incomes and growing inequality. (See, 
e.g., World Bank 2005, Guiliani et al 2004, Palma 2005, Reinert and Kattel 2007, and 
Amsden 2007) Second, increasing trade in terms of imports from developing 
countries and outsourcing of jobs to poorer regions has had somewhat similar impact 
in some of the most developed countries: stagnating real wages and growing income 
inequality during the last decade; prime examples of such trends are the US and 
Germany. (See, most recently, Krugman 2008; further also Samuelson 2004) 
As to the first trend, Figures 1-4
2
 give a snapshot view of macroeconomic 
developments in key developing countries during the last decades. What is 
remarkable in these figures is not the exhilarating raise in FDI and exports (Figures 1-
3), but the stunningly obvious divergence in real income growth between Asian 
economies, on the one hand, and Hungary and Mexico, both key countries for their 
respective regions as far as FDI and exports are concerned, on the other hand (Figure 
4). While China and Korea have seen their GDP per capita multiplied at least 4 times 
since 1980, Hungary and Mexico have struggled throughout the last decades to stay 
above the 1980 level. While some argue that the decades after 1980 have been the 
best development decades in a generation (for instance, Rodrik 2007, 13-14 and 
Skidelsky 2008),
3
 it is difficult to deny that there is something similar to „China price‟ 
in the development statistics of the poorer countries from 1980 onwards: if one 
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deducts China‟s and India‟s growth from developing countries‟ data, there is not 
much left as far as growth and development in the rest of the developing world is 
concerned (as also Rodrik 2007 admits).  
 
Figure 1. High-technology exports (% of 
manufactured exports), 1988-2006. 
 




Figure 3. Foreign direct investment, net (BoP, 
current US$, billions), 1980-2006. 
 
Figure 4. GDP per person employed, index 
(1980 = 100), 1980-2006. 
 
As the World Bank admits, rest of the developing countries, notably in Africa, Latin 
America and some of the former Soviet republics (Moldova, Ukraine, the ones in 
Central Asia) suffer from heavy doses of a cognitive dissonance between promised 
growth and the reality where most of these countries have been standing still, if they 
are lucky, or dropping backwards to income levels of earlier decades: “Whereas Latin 
America‟s income per head grew by 10 percent in the entire 25 years from 1980 to 
2005, it grew by 82 percent in the 20 years from 1960 to 1980.” (Amsden 2007, 6; 
also World Bank 2005) According the World Bank‟s calculations, the recession many 
former Soviet republics experienced during 1990s, and are still experiencing, is worse 
than the Great Depression in the USA and the World War II in Western Europe (both 
recovered considerably quicker). In fact, for example, “even if Ukraine managed to 
grow steadily at 5 percent a year, starting in 2002, it would take until 2017 to regain 
its previous peak – implying a transformational recession of more than a quarter of a 
century at best.” 




Accompanying such dismal developments in developing countries is another 
abovementioned trend; Figures 5-7 give, again in a rather simplified way, overview of 
developments in leading developed countries such as the US and Germany.  
 
 
Figure 5. Real wages and productivity growth 
in the US, 1995-2006 
 
Source: State of Working America, 
www.stateofworkingamerica.org.  
Figure 6. Germany‟s export and wage growth, 
% changes on the previous year, 1997-2006. 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, 
www.destatis.de; calculations by the authors.
While the US economy has been one of the world‟s top performers in productivity 
growth over the past 15 years (in fact during the entire post-WWII period
4
), real wage 
growth has stalled and there is a clear trend towards falling wages (Figure 5). 
Similarly, while Germany‟s wage growth flat-lined for most of the last decade, 
Germany became world‟s number one exporter with highly impressive annual export 
growth (Figure 6). 
Figure 7. Real exchange rate and relative export performance in euro area, 1999-2006. 
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Source: Pisani-Ferry et al 2008, 21. 
Figure 7 illustrates how such contradictory trends in Germany impact competitiveness 
of other countries in euro area. Most euro area countries suffer from real exchange 
rate appreciation, as they cannot compete with Germany‟s productivity and export 
growth, and are thus faced with growing downward pressures on their wages.
5
  
It seems quite obvious that both these global trends – high level of exports and FDI 
but low wage growth in developing countries, and high productivity and export 
growth but stagnating wages in developed countries – are different side of the same 
coin and it seems equally valid to assume (as, e.g., Krugman 2008 does) that this coin 
is globalization in the form of increasingly liberalized (financial) markets and trade. 
Clearly, there are also sweeping technological changes, in particularly in ICT, that 
have enabled enormous changes in ways value-chains, production and services are 
geographically located. (Perez 2002, 2004 and 2006) However, below we argue that it 
is the policy response in many developing countries to globalization and to ICT-led 
technological change that takes large part of responsibility for the phenomena 
described above. The policy response has been generally twofold: first, emphasis on 
Washington Consensus type of macroeconomic stability (low inflation, balanced 
public budgets etc), and, second, creation of innovation policies targeting mainly 
high-tech sectors (within sectors or as such, via R&D grants, technology parks etc). 
In theory, macroeconomic stability should open the way for foreign direct 
investments, and it has (see as an example Figure 3 above); innovation policy should 
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enable upgrading and diversification, and it has not (see, e.g., Guiliani et al 2004, 
McDermott 2005, Tiits et al 2008, and detailed discussion in the next section). We 
will argue that while innovation and industrial policies in the developing countries 
tend to mimic Western solutions such policies are generally ill fitted for their 
respective economic structures that have been significantly changed by Washington 
Consensus policies. As we will argue below, the developing countries policy response 
ends up solving problems that are not there and not dealing with upgrading and 
diversification issues they need to face. However, by now economists and policy 
makers are starting to realize that without the latter, increased trade and globalization 
end up being a race to the bottom for many countries, jobs and industrial sectors. 
In short, we will argue below that there are three reasons for the contrasting global 
trends described above: First, techno-economic paradigm change connected, second, 
with macro-economic environment created by the Washington Consensus policies 
and, third, innovation and industrial policies created by many developing countries. 
All of these changes took place in 1990s and this historical coincidence (compounded 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union) created enormous dynamic forces in the global 
economy that explain the described trends. We will also try to show what needs to be 
done in order to give these dynamic forces a somewhat different direction for a more 
equitable form of global capitalism to take shape. 
In order to do this, we try to show in this essay how Latin American (LA) and Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) innovation policies, despite the remarkable differences 
in history and geography, are converging and exhibiting very similar features and 
failing on very similar issues. This is obviously not an easy comparative task in terms 
of methodology and data. Indeed, first methodological obstacle is whether one can 
and should compare LA and CEE in the first place? Despite huge differences, we 
argue that there are also significant similarities: 1) both regions experienced rapid 
liberalization in late 1980s and in 1990s after decades of high protectionism; 2) both 
regions are geographically peripheral to big and developed markets (the US and the 
EU respectively); 3) during 1990s, both CEE and LA received and followed highly 
similar policy advice in terms of economic and innovation policies, but also in the 
areas of public administration reform; 4) in both regions economic integration into 
much wealthier economic areas (EU, NAFTA) is crucial economic driver. These and 
further similarities make the comparative approach highly interesting, especially as 
LA is seen largely as a failure (see, e.g., Amsden 2007, 6; also Chang 2007)), CEE in 
turn is seen as a success story; so for instance, at the end of 2005, Business Week ran a 
cover story (incidentally for one of the last issues of its European edition) titled 
“Central Europe – Rise of a Powerhouse”. 
However, both CEE and LA are, first, in themselves highly diversified regions and, 
second, there are hardly any studies or datasets that include both regions. Availability 
of comparative data is clearly a problem for this study. Thus, we propose to look at 
the following data and stylized facts: 1) Dynamics of economic structure of the 
economy, value-added in industry and services since 1990 or earliest available (using 
World Bank data); 2) stylized facts from literature and case studies on outsourcing, 
clustering, enclave economies, regional inequality, etc; 3) historical overview of 
macroeconomic and in particular innovation policy developments since 1990s. There 
is one further key area, namely the developments in policy design and management, 
in short the impact of administrative reforms on innovation policy, that we cannot 
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deal with any great detail here due to lack of significant empirical studies. The impact 
of integration into the EU and NAFTA respectively will be treated rather briefly. 
II Stylized facts of economic development in LA and CEE since 1990. 
In this section we try to briefly describe which changes took place in late 1980s and 
1990s in LA and CEE. Both regions saw massive changes in policy environment and 
both regions can be called model cases of applying the Washington Consensus 
policies of „liberalize, privatize, stabilize‟ (more on policies in the next section). As 
we saw in Figures 1-4 above, while such policies were increasingly successful in 
attracting FDI to CEE and LA, and considerably increasing exports (also in high 
technology), they have had much more limited impact on real wage growth, 
especially in LA. In addition, Figures 8-14 depict these developments in somewhat 
greater detail.
6
 Figures 8-10 would indicate that LA and CEE countries followed 
roughly the same path of deindustrialization in which both employment in industry 
and industry‟s value added in GDP dropped and services followed exactly the 
opposite path: growing employment and value added share in GDP. However, if we 
look at the levels of productivity (value added per capita in this case), we see that its 
growth in LA and CEE was nowhere near that of Korea during the period 1990-2005. 
This can be taken as proxy for growing technological complexity and diversity, and 
this seems to be lacking in CEE and LA countries‟ development dynamics. 
Indeed, Figures 11-12 show a long-term development of both industry and services 
productivity in LA and CEE, and here we can see how Korea has in industry caught 
up and actually surpassed middle income economy Spain and is also catching up in 
services. However, both CEE and LA clearly lag in productivity and especially during 
1990s these regions fell actually behind rather than caught up. 
Figures 13 and 14 depict different options to measure GDP per capita. Here we see 
very similar trends to productivity developments: first, Korea has clearly caught with 
countries like Portugal; second, CEE countries saw a drastic drop in GDP per capita 
during the 1990s and while some countries like Estonia have recovered by early 
2000s, the recession was for most CEE (and other former Soviet republics) severe. 
Indeed, if we look at the case of Moldova on Figure 14, we see that it was 
considerably richer than China in 1980, but by 2006 China‟s per capita GDP is almost 
twice that of Moldova. We can also see on Figure 14 that Korea was poorer than 
Brazil, Peru and Estonia in 1980, and by 2006 it has grown to be significantly more 
wealthy than Brazil and Peru while Estonia‟s growth in the last few years has been 
also impressive (this goes back to considerable consumption and real estate boom in 
mid-2000; see discussion below). 
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Figure 8. Changes in industry, 1990-2005. 
 
Figure 9. Changes in services, 1990-2005. 
Figure 10. Industry value added (% of GDP), 
1965-2006.  
 
Figure 11. Industry value added per capita 
(millions), constant 2000 USD, 1971-2005. 
 
Figure 12. Services value added per capita 
(millions), in constant 2000 USD, 1971-2005 
 
Figure 13. GDP per person employed, index 
(1980 = 100), 1980-2006. 
 
Figure 14. GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 




In the following sub-section we will take a closer look at LA and CEE through some 
stylized facts and trends. 
II.1 Developments in CEE
7
 
At the end of the 1980s, Eastern European and former Soviet economies were 
generally highly industrialized; many of these economies were on a similar 
industrialization and growth path as the East Asian economies. Indeed, according to 
the World Bank data, countries like Estonia, Latvia and Hungary were ahead of Korea 
during in the early 1980s in terms of industrial value added per capita (see Figure 11 
above). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, most CEE and other former Soviet 
economies saw deep dives in their growth rates and in industry as well as service 
sector value added. It took more than a decade for most CEE countries to reach the 
growth and development levels of 1990; many, however, still severely lag behind 
their development levels of 1990.
8
  
It can be argued that such a level of industrialization was mostly artificial; that it was 
created by highly inefficient and wasteful planning, and not by market forces; that it 
was created by military and strategic needs, rather than comparative or competitive 
advantages. Indeed, arguably such a line of thought was and still is prevailing in 
discussions of Soviet industry (see, e.g., Kovacs and Marton 1992). Alternatively, it 
can be argued that the rapid de-industrialization witnessed in most CEE countries 
(and, more drastically, in former Soviet republics) after 1990 was, at least partially, a 
process of natural de-industrialization: many industrial jobs move to lower-cost 
locations and are replaced by service jobs.  
However, one of the most striking features of post-Soviet development in the 1990s 
was the rapid primitivization of industrial enterprises or even the outright destruction 
of many previously well-known and successful companies. This happened because of 
the way Soviet industrial companies and the industry in general were built up and ran 
in a complex web of planning and competition.
9
 In addition, as we will show below, 
policy framework created for the transformation of these companies in the 1990s 
completely misunderstood the nature of industrial companies and partially actively 
sought to demolish them (e.g. Sachsian shock therapy; see also Kregel et al. 1992). 
It has been one of the gravest misunderstandings of Soviet economy to simply dismiss 
it as a thoroughly planned economy where private initiative and competitive forces 
played no role whatsoever. On the contrary, perhaps the most defining feature of 
Soviet industrial enterprise was its complexity. If we look at a typical industrial 
company with its relationships to government offices, suppliers, consumers, and 
„competitors‟, it is clear that success came through managing well the increasingly 
complex web of relationships and, in particular, (arguably peculiar) feedback linkages 
along the value-chain (particularly in terms of quality control). Essentially, a Soviet 
                                                        
7
 This section builds on Tiits et al 2008 and Reinert and Kattel 2007. 
8 For instance, countries like Ukraine, Moldova, and most central Asian countries fell from middle 
income economies to poor countries and by now represent failed or fragile economies; see further 
Reinert, Amaïzo
 
and Kattel 2008 
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 For studies of Soviet industry, see Berliner 1976, Bergson 1978, and case studies like that of Skoda 
by Margolius and Meisl and of East Germany‟s industry by Stokes 2000 and of Czech industry by 
Kosta 2005. For case studies on company level transition to capitalism, see Radosevic and Yoruk 2001. 
 
 9 
industrial company was what we today call an industrial cluster of various companies 
and activities that create external economies useful to all or at least most cluster 
members. In Soviet reality, this often meant very strong vertical integration (if one 
produced carpets, one often also produced machinery for carpet production) and huge 
companies that operated under what might be called artificial economies of scale (and 
to a lesser degree of scope). These economies of scale depended largely on planned 
demand. Such very strong vertical integration meant that the most successful and 
progressive Soviet companies often built their own ICT labs (however rudimentary) 
in 1980s or, as in the case of a few Estonian agricultural complexes, invested into 
early biotechnological technologies in late 1980s. However, taken together, scale 
economies, strong vertical integration and planned demand created enormous barriers 
to entry that protected such companies from virtually any competition. The latter can 
be understood as a negative externality that prevented almost any spin-offs from these 
companies.  
A sudden opening of the markets and abolition of capital controls made these 
industrial companies extremely vulnerable. The partially extreme vertical integration 
meant that if one part of the value chain ran into problems due to the rapid 
liberalization, it easily brought down the entire chain. However, foreign companies 
seeking to privatize plants were almost always interested in only part of the value-
chain (a specific production plant, infrastructure or location) and thus privatization 
turned into publicly led attrition of companies and jobs.
10
 The previously protective 
barriers to entry turned into truly negative externality in form of almost complete lack 
of experience in competing in a free market economy.
11
 And since many companies 
were rather broadly specialized, it was almost inevitable for many if not most of them 
to run into problems as foreign competition was instant after opening of markets. 
Liberalization of markets and prices meant that for many domestic companies, 
demand was cut down and thus companies with the highest relative fixed costs to 
variable costs (these tend also to be the technologically most advanced ones) were hit 
the hardest as their balance sheets worsened very quickly. If a company had a lot of 
machinery and equipment to be amortized, i.e. there have been recent investments 
into upgrading, then it is particularly harshly hit if its demand drops and if it is under 
financial stress because of liabilities to newly founded banks. Thus, by definition, the 
most advanced industries were hit by rapid liberalization first and also the hardest. 
This is called Vanek-Reinert effect
12
 and it can be observed in Latin America in the 
1980s (see more below) and, again, in the 1990s in CEE and other post-Soviet 
countries. Due to the particular nature of their industries, CEE and other former 
Soviet industries experienced a particularly drastic form of the Vanek-Reinert effect 
in the early 1990s and, as we have seen above, many economies have not recovered 
from this yet. As a result, the share of CEE and other former Soviet republics‟ share 
in world manufacturing plummeted from 19.3% in 1980 to 2.7% in 2001. (UNCTAD 
2004)  
Such a drastic change made it relatively easy to actually replace Soviet industry: with 
the macroeconomic stability and liberalization of markets, followed by a rapid drop in 
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wages, many former Soviet economies became increasingly attractive as privatization 
targets and outsourcing of production (we will return to policies in the next section). 
Indeed, one of the most fundamental characteristics of CEE industry (and services) 
since 1990 has been that the majority of companies have actually engaged in process 
innovation (e.g. in the form of acquisition of new machinery) in seeking to become 
more and more cost-effective in the new market place. The relatively lax neo-liberal 
labour regulations have also been helpful in this. That is, innovation in CEE is very 
often of the kind that brings lower prices to consumers (both within the value chain 
and in the end market).  
In addition, innovations not only change the organizational forms of companies (e.g. 
using ICT allows for more flexible organizational structure), but moreover different 
organizational forms are conducive for different innovations. Recent research shows 
that highly developed Nordic countries tend to have a significantly higher degree of 
companies with lean manufacturing and learning organization techniques (worker 
independence in decision-making etc) than Southern European countries. (Lorenz and 
Lundvall 2006)
 
CEE companies tend to similarly focus on less worker independence, 
simple production tasks and work organization. Thus, the industrial change during the 
1990s strongly lessened the demand for skills, R&D and product development. As a 
result, many CEE countries left educational, science and R&D systems largely intact 
and now face an increasing gap between skills offered by the education system and 
skills needed by companies to climb the value ladder. 
Even though we have argued that both CEE and other former Soviet economies saw a 
drastic industrial decline after 1990, and that broadly speaking, both groups of 
countries followed, particularly in the early 1990s, very similar policies of 
liberalization, it remains unclear why so many former Soviet republics (like Ukraine, 
Moldova, Central Asian countries) fared much worse than CEE. Part of the answer 
lies in the long-term cultural and political past: countries like Hungary, the Czech and 
Slovak Republics, and even the Baltic countries had experienced independence and 
also successful economic development during the interwar period; Estonia, for 
instance, was a richer and stronger economy in the late 1930s than Finland. Another 
explanatory piece in the puzzle is that the political reforms and the relative (legal and 
political) stability these brought to many CEE countries are in stark contrast to the 
political upheavals and the rampant corruption evident in Belarus, Ukraine and 
Russia. (Bracho and Julio López 2005 offer an excellent case study of Russia) Yet, 
additional, and perhaps one of the most significant, explanations lie in the different 
trade patterns and the geographical vicinity to developed markets. 
CEE countries‟ trade (both in terms of export and import) specialization moved very 
quickly towards Western Europe, while the rest of former Soviet economies, trade 
specialization, particularly in terms of export markets, remains regionally dominated 
and, which is very significant, strongly resource-based. These economies experience 
terms of trade that, as Hans Singer argued more than 50 years ago, forces these 
countries into more and more stronger specialization into activities where innovation 
expresses itself in either lower prices and thus lower margins or, in the case of 
resource-based activities, in exorbitant concentration of wealth in the hands of very 
few. (Singer 1950) 
CEE countries, in turn, have profited from trading with European economies, which 
often brings the need to manage production (e.g. in an outsourcing factory) in terms 
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acceptable to Western partners, particularly in terms of quality and time. What has 
essentially happened in CEE is that these countries specialize in industrial (and often 
also in service) activities where wage levels have become too high in Western Europe 
and where there are huge parts of the value chain where the taylorist mass production 
paradigm can still be employed with relative ease. Thus, the drastic primitivization 
and loss of skills and demand for skills during the 1990s is easily overlooked as new 
Zara, Ikea etc factories keep popping up all over CEE economies. 
II.2 Developments in LA
13
 
As we have seen in the Figures above, the 1990s were for most LA countries a 
continuation of trends that go back to early 1980s. As Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi 2005 
argue, during the last decade “two different specialization patterns emerged in the 
post-reform period, the one based on natural resources, basically in the Southern 
Cone, and the other on labor-intensive activities, especially in Central America and 
the Caribbean. … Argentina and Chile, for example, reoriented production structures 
towards raw materials and natural resources processing activities, while Mexico and 
many Central American countries moved towards maquila type industries.” (9)  
 
However, while there are clear sub-regional differences, there are, as in the CEE case, 
clear commonalities among Latin American and Caribbean countries: “the scant 
pervasiveness and diffusion of knowledge and intangibles in regional production 
systems”. (Ibid.) As in CEE, also LA countries are persistently specialized into low 
technology intensive industries and/or production stages (ECLAC 2004). Such 
specialization patterns “favored the generation of an industrial structure that, „per se‟, 
limited endogenous technological capabilities and expresses a scant demand for 
knowledge, thus implicitly limiting the potential positive stimuli effect towards 
technological catch up of liberalization and increased competition.” (Cimoli, Ferraz 
and Primi 2005, 9-10) Indeed, if we look at the technology intensity of export 
industries (comparing the market share of technology intensive exports with the 
market share of low technology exports), we see that Asian economies experienced a 
rapidly increasing share of technology intensive exports while Latin America and the 
Caribbean, however, register only a modest increment in this (see in detail Cimoli, 
Peres, Primi 2005, 10-11; see also Reinhardt and Peres 2000; Mortimore and Peres 
2001). Yet, if we exclude Mexico, the pattern of the Latin American specialization 
has not in fact changed over the last decade or more. (Cimoli, Peres, Primi 2005, 10-
11) However, as Palma 2005 has impressively argued, while Mexico‟s growth in high 
technology exports has been nothing short of remarkable, “it has been associated with 
both the collapse of the export multiplier and the „de-linkaging‟ of the export sector 
from the rest of the economy; this has produced a situation in which increasing export 
competitiveness has had little effect on growth and the living standards of the 
majority of the population.” (943) Moreover, this has led to the rise of enclave 
economy where relatively high-tech islands of mostly outsourcing factories for global 





                                                        
13
 This section builds on Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi 2005; see further also Palma 2005, Cimoli 2000, 
Burlamaqui et al 2007. 
14
 Gallagher and Zarsky 2007 is an excellent case study of Mexico‟s IT sector as an enclave economy; 
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As we have seen above, similar picture emerges when we look at the share of 
technology intensive production in total manufacturing value added: “In Latin 
America during the 1970s an improvement can be observed but since 1982 scarcely 
any change can be noted. The opening up process favored the modernization of 
regional production structure and the reorientation of regional specialization patterns, 
but technological intensive activities still represent only around 30% of total 
manufacturing value added, approximately 60% of which is due to transport 
equipment industry. On the contrary, South Korea managed to catch up and even 
forge ahead. During the nineties both in USA and South Korea more than 60% of 
manufacturing value added was generated in technology intensive industries.” 
(Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi 2005, 11)    
 
In addition, by 2000s, around 40% of the 500 largest Latin American corporations 
where foreign owned, compared to around 30% at the beginning of the nineties 
(ECLAC 2004). It can be argued that “structural debilities of local economies and 
competitive pressures originating from liberalization and structural reforms imposed a 
dilemma for large size, locally owned companies: either to further expand abroad or 
to sell or transfer ownership to foreign companies.” (Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi 2005, 
11-12) As in CEE, “privatization of utilities and commodities also played a major role 
in reshaping ownership patterns” (ibid., 12). 
  
Again similarly to CEE,  
 
regional firms that managed to integrate into international production chains positioned 
themselves in low technology activities, while transnational companies kept the lead of 
production networks, mastering the generation, promoting the diffusion and appropriating the 
benefits accrued from accumulation of technology and innovation. These companies control 
and determine the specialization pattern of Latin American owned enterprises through their 
outsourcing and networking strategies. In effect, regional firms participate in global 
production systems mainly performing at the lowest hierarchical levels, generally far away 
from control positions, and, in general, carrying out raw materials processing or basic 
assembling activities. Indeed, competitive pressures in global markets, where strong actors 
benefit from increasing returns led international network hierarchies‟ leaders, which are 
mainly located in developed economies, to profit from international trade outsourcing, 
subcontracting or re-localizing production activities according to static comparative 
advantages. (Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi 2005, 12; see also Cimoli and Katz 2003) 
 
Such developments and in particular competitive pressures led to increasing number 
of process innovations in form of rationalizations such as “expansion of components 
imports, outsourcing of non-core activities, adoption of new organizational 
techniques, like quality systems controls and just in time management, and the 
localized introduction of new equipment, especially those of microelectronics base.” 
(Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi 2005, 12) It is not surprising that in a landscape dominated 
by foreign companies and weak local scientific and technological infrastructure, there 
are strong incentives “for companies to increasingly rely on foreign sources of 
knowledge and, what is even more important, the few results of innovation and 
technological upgrading in the region are not appropriated locally but tend to be 
transferred abroad thus hardly contributing to the development of innovative capacity 
of Latin American and Caribbean countries.” (Ibid.) Similarly to CEE developments, 





many Latin American and Caribbean research centers and laboratories of domestic enterprises 
were closed up during the last decade due to the change in the logic of innovation investments 
in open economies. In effect, controlling companies, mainly located in advanced economies, 
benefit from comparative advantages in technology and innovation. … Indeed, multinational 
companies concentrate the bulk of research and development activities in their countries of 
origin or, as recent tendencies suggest, in strongly dynamic economies that are specialized in 
highly technological intensive industries and that represent huge potential markets for 
technological produce, like China. (Ibid., 12) 
  
Thus, to sum up, during the decade of economic liberalization, “Latin America and 
the Caribbean came up with a simple production structure, increasingly fragmented 
and disarticulated in terms of local capabilities and progressively more outward linked 
and dependent that absorbs more and more knowledge and technology from abroad 
thus undermining its endogenous capacity of innovation and knowledge generation 
and diffusion.” (Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi 2005, 13)   
 
II.3 Summary 
Both CEE and Latin American integration to global trade is occurring on largely 
asymmetric basis.
15
 In both cases, “domestic agents participate in international 
production processes but they are marginal actors in the globalization of scientific and 
technological activities.” (Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi 2005, 13) Figure 15 attempts to 
summarize a vicious circle of technological specialization that has emerged both in 
CEE and LA. Just to remind, this vicious circle has taken shape despite high growth 
rates in exports. 
 
Figure 15. Summary of stylized facts of economic development and innovation in CEE and LA since 
1990. 
 
Source: Authors‟ elaboration. 
The key to understand why CEE and especially LA seem to stand still or even fall 
behind when compared to Asian economies such as South Korea is the way many 
industrial companies were integrated into the world economy in 1990s. As we argue 
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 See further Reinert and Kattel 2007 on taxonomy of economic integrations. 
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above, both CEE and LA strongly embraced the idea of FDI-led restructuring and 
probably the strongest surprise for the entire development community since 1990s has 
been the dramatic way FDI-led strategies have worked: specialization at the lower end 
of the value chain with grave difficulties of upgrading and, most importantly, strong 
enclavization and de-linkaging tendencies. As we will show below, the key why FDI-
led strategies worked in such a way lays in a historic coincidence of techno-economic 
paradigm change and the onslaught of Washington Consensus policies taking place 
more or less at the same time. Here, however, it is important to see how such FDI-led 
strategies had major impact on, first, the way most companies in CEE and LA 
innovate and, second, why there is generally such a low demand for high skills from 
industry (deepening enclave and de-lingaking effects). These lead, further, to high 
financing costs of product development and other similar risks for many CEE and LA 
companies, in opposition to financial institutions and consumption (see also Kregel 
2008). Compounding all of the above, networking within industrial sectors and 
between sectors and educational and R&D institutions is bound to be very low and 
linkages between companies tend to stay very weak (no real to cooperate within the 
vicious circle as foreign demand in form of outsourcing is key for company 
development). As we will show in the next section, most innovation policy initiatives 
in CEE and LA tend start at the end of the described problems: offering either some 
sort of financing in order to alleviate the perceived „market failure‟ in funding of 
innovation or try to enhance networking among companies and universities. However, 
without tackling technological capabilities and structural characteristics of the 
respective economies, such policies are bound to stay highly ineffectual. 
III Economic and Innovation Policies in LA and CEE since 1990. 
In this section we describe in detail the macro-economic environment and policies 
that would explain the stylized facts of CEE and LA development described above. 
As we mention above, the FDI-led outsourcing was greatly enabled by the change of 
the techno-economic paradigm that, however, was spread from core countries such as 
the US via the Washington Consensus policies to the periphery in a quite peculiar 
way. 
III.1 Techno-economic paradigm change 
The idea of techno-economic paradigms as developed by Carlota Perez is summarized 
in Table 1. The paradigms essentially last somewhere around half a century and 
consist of a „common sense‟ of how capitalism of a specific period works and 
develops. It also describes how technological change and innovation of a given period 
are most likely to take place: organizational forms and finance that are conducive to 
innovations, what technological capabilities and skills are needed etc. 
Table 1:  
Technological 
revolution 
Core country  
New technologies and new 
or redefined industries 
New or redefined 
infrastructures 
Techno-economic paradigm 





Core country  
New technologies and new 
or redefined industries 
New or redefined 
infrastructures 
Techno-economic paradigm 






Mechanized cotton industry  
Wrought iron 
Machinery 
Canals and waterways 
Turnpike roads 
Water power (highly 
improved water wheels) 
Factory production 
Mechanization 
Productivity/ time keeping and time saving 
Fluidity of movement (as ideal for machines 
with water-power and for transport through 




Age of Steam 
and Railways 





Steam engines and 
machinery (made in iron; 
fueled by coal) 
Iron and coal mining (now 
playing a central role in 
growth)* 
Railway construction 
Rolling stock production 
Steam power for many 
industries 
(including textiles) 
Railways (Use of steam 
engine) 
Universal postal service 
Telegraph (mainly nationally 
along railway lines) 
Great ports, great depots and 
worldwide sailing ships 
City gas 
Economies of agglomeration/ Industrial 
cities/ National markets 
Power centers with national networks 
Scale as progress 
Standard parts/ machine-made machines 
Energy where needed (steam) 
Interdependent movement (of machines and 
of means of transport) 
THIRD: From 
1875  









Cheap steel (especially 
Bessemer)  
Full development of steam 
engine for steel ships 
Heavy chemistry and civil 
engineering 
Electrical equipment industry 
Copper and cables 
Canned and bottled food 
Paper and packaging 
Worldwide shipping in rapid 
steel steamships (use of Suez 
Canal) 
Worldwide railways (use of 
cheap steel rails and bolts in 
standard sizes). 
Great bridges and tunnels 
Worldwide Telegraph  
Telephone (mainly nationally) 
Electrical networks (for 
illumination and industrial 
use) 
Giant structures (steel) 
Economies of scale of plant/ vertical 
integration 
Distributed power for industry (electricity) 
Science as a productive force 
Worldwide networks and empires (including 
cartels) 
Universal standardization 
Cost accounting for control and efficiency 
Great scale for world market power/ „small‟ is 
successful, if local  
FOURTH: 
From 1908 










Cheap oil and oil fuels 
Petrochemicals (synthetics) 
Internal combustion engine 
for automobiles, transport, 
tractors, airplanes, war tanks 
and electricity 
Home electrical appliances 
Refrigerated and frozen 
foods 
Networks of roads, highways, 
ports and airports  
Networks of oil ducts 




(telephone, telex and 
cablegram) wire and wireless 
Mass production/mass markets 
Economies of scale (product and market 
volume)/ horizontal integration 
Standardization of products 
Energy intensity (oil based) 
Synthetic materials 










Core country  
New technologies and new 
or redefined industries 
New or redefined 
infrastructures 
Techno-economic paradigm 






















fiber optics, radio and 
satellite)  
Internet/ Electronic mail and 
other e-services 
Multiple source, flexible use, 
electricity networks 
High-speed physical transport 
links (by land, air and water)  
Information-intensity (microelectronics-based 
ICT) 
Decentralized integration/ network structures 
Knowledge as capital / intangible value added  
Heterogeneity, diversity, adaptability 
Segmentation of markets/ proliferation of 
niches 
Economies of scope and specialization 
combined with scale 
Globalization/ interaction between the global 
and the local 
Inward and outward cooperation/ clusters 
Instant contact and action / instant global 
communications 
Source: Perez 2006; see also Perez 2002. 
New ICT-based techno-economic paradigm, coming to full force in 1990s, has 
engendered key changes in production processes in almost all industries (including 
many services and agriculture): outsourcing and breaking up of various production 
functions has created strong de-agglomeration pressures for previously highly 
industrialized centers and cities. As we have seen above, this has led to enormous 
growth in developing country exports but also to growing inequalities. Particularly 
not highly developed and peripheral areas and/or regions have experienced growing 
(regional) income inequality; and virtually everywhere one can see the share of wages 
in GDP declining as a result of lowered welfare regulations as well as because of loss 
of middle income jobs.
16
 Essentially this means that gains from technological change 
and innovation do not „travel‟ geographically so easily anymore as the mass-
production consensus of large production units and mass employment has scattered in 
many places in favor of highly specialized networks that operate and source 
production and knowledge often supra-regionally or even globally. On the other hand, 
it is relatively easy to fall into a vicious circle of increasing competition, pressure to 
cut costs and lower wages, trying to lure foreign investors with extensive concessions 
(in taxes etc). At the same time, ICT-led paradigm also enables creation of niche 
markets that have a potential to become supra-regional or even global, for instance 
hospitals specializing into specific heart surgery etc. (See, e.g., Prahalad 2006 for 
interesting case studies) 
Thus, the ICT-led paradigm is increasing pressures for de-agglomeration, de-
linkaging and de-diversifying and this has become the key challenge to many smaller 
and/or peripheral nations/areas as here such pressures are naturally already quite high. 
However, it is not so much the issue of size as such (e.g., scarcity in human capital) 
that has become important again, but rather a combination of geographic location and 
economic specialization patterns. This can be summarized as a position a nation or a 
region holds in international value chain. For instance, while Finland is both 
geographically peripheral and demographically relatively small (ca 5 million 
inhabitants), its place in international mobile phone value chain is distinctly very 
high. However, also Finland is seeing a growing outflow of R&D activities into 
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 Samuelson 2004 and Krugman 2008 provide fruitful discussion of these issues. 
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regions with lower costs and larger agglomeration effects such as India. We argue that 
ICT-led paradigm significantly amplifies such de-agglomeration effects.
17
  
It can be argued that such logic of spreading global production networks that create 
de-agglomeration and de-linkaging effects is not inevitable to the ICT-paradigm 
(Perez 2006). This may indeed be true, however the global macroeconomic 
environment – namely, the policies of Washington Consensus – create significant 
incentives to instate policies that enable the adverse effects of ICT-paradigm to be 
particularly strong.  
III.2 Washington Consensus policies 
There are certainly various intellectual and ideological reasons behind the raise of 
Washington Consensus, one of the key ideas behind it, however, was “a return to the 
19
th
 century strategy based on open trade via the elimination of internal development 
institutions to allow comparative advantage trade financed by external resources to act 
as an engine of growth.” (Kregel 2008) Just as in the 19
th
 century the key driver 
behind such ideas is the problem of financing growth. Indeed, also Washington 
Consensus became essentially obsessed with question of how to generate sustainable 
financing for development.
18
 Classical development economists such as Ragnar 
Nurkse argued that financing of development based on trade as engine of growth was 
only possible in 19
th
 century because England was mainly trading with resource rich 
colonies largely populated by emigrants from England and Europe (that is, with 
highly skilled work force). (Nurkse 1961) Nurkse and other development pioneers 
were very keen in warning that without such preconditions, development strategies 
based on increased trade and foreign investments will rarely if ever work and will 
result in what we would today be called a lock-in into resource-based and low 
technology areas. However, financial globalization that took off after the collapse of 
Bretton Woods system in 1970s offered an apparently irresistible combination of 
perceived problems and solutions: developing countries needing funding for 
development projects (such as import substitution industrialization) and increasing 
amount of private investments floating around in search of investment opportunities 
in the affluent countries. The calculation behind Washington Consensus policies was 
thus relatively straightforward: need for investments in developing countries and need 
for investment opportunities in developed countries can be matched with 
internationally similar macro-economic policy regime that welcomes outside private 
funding that, in turn, can have a multiplier effect through increased trade that brings 
more funding and so on a virtuous circle is born. 
Behind this lay however a key assumption about Latin American technological 
development that was later applied also to CEE. Namely, state enterprise (and by 
default, import substitution industrialization and planned economy respectively) have 
created inefficient and artificial industrial structure and specialization (i.e. arguments 
that not every country needs its own aero industry etc). Inefficiency is here clearly 
based on Ricardian comparative advantage thinking. Thus, Washington Consensus 
policies became essentially the vehicles to deliver industrial restructuring and, in 
                                                        
17 Kattel, Kalvet and Randma-Liiv 2009 discusses these issues in more detail. 
18 Williamson‟s original 1990 list of policies that Washington can more or less agree on concentrates 
mainly on financial issues; see Williamson 2000 
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particular in the case of CEE, replacement of what were perceived to be highly 
inefficient companies. 
However, there were two essential problems ignored in devising such policies to 
deliver restructuring: First, integrating regions with relatively different levels of 
development will led, as the classical development economists predicted, to 
unleashing of Vanek-Reinert effect and thus to serious de-industrialization. And 
second, not all (or even nearly majority) of foreign private lending went into domestic 
upgrading investment, but rather into consumption through financial institutions. This 
is again something predicted by Nurkse and others as demonstration effect: 
consumers in developing countries tend to emulate consumption patterns of 
developed countries (e.g. buying latest fashion mobile phones etc). Thus, increased 
financial fragility through deteriorating balance of payments is almost certain to 
accompany such policies. As Kregel argues about LA,  
External financing of import-substituting investment, if successful, may improve a country‟s 
net trade balance in the long run, but it initially does not generate any additional foreign 
exchange earnings to meet debt service. In addition, increased domestic investment in 
consumption goods production will increase imports of foreign capital goods and the resulting 
increase in activity may stress domestic supply, also increasing imports of consumption goods 
and putting pressure on prices. (2008)  
He goes on to conclude that  
a rapid increase in external financing (much of which was not used for import substitution at 
all), such as the one that occurred in the 1970s, places a heavy burden on a country‟s balance 
of payments that can only be financed by increased foreign borrowing. This appears to have 
been the case in Latin America in the 1970s as increased borrowing was used to meet 
increasing debt service in a sort of Ponzi scheme. … The problems that were faced by import 
substitution industrialization were caused as much by the inappropriate and potentially 
incendiary mix of financing domestic import substitution industrialization through private 
external financial flows as in the inherent difficulties in building sufficiently large domestic 
markets to support competitive domestic industry and avoid rent-seeking behavior. (2008) 
Almost a quarter of a century later we see these phenomena being repeated in CEE all 
over again: fast growth in FDI in 1990s was accompanied by negative current account 
balances in all CEE countries (Tiits et al 2008) and by the mid-2000s all CEE 
countries experience strong consumption and real estate led boom that brings most of 
these countries on the brink of a Ponzi scheme. (See, e.g., Fitch 2007a, 2007b and 
2007c) Indeed, most CEE countries are highly dependent on foreign investments and 
private borrowing (usually in foreign currency) and thus they are caught in a 
macroeconomic dead end with appreciating exchange rates, negative current account 
balances and growing private indebtedness. Thus, restructuring of industry in 1990s 
into a lower end outsourcing activities is accompanied by increased imports, 
overvaluation of exchange rate and thus by financial fragility and loss of 
competitiveness. 
Coupled with the change of techno-economic paradigm, Washington Consensus 
policies emphasising FDI-led growth have created for both LA and CEE a truly toxic 
situation were initially liability destruction was strong and quick but followed by slow 
asset creation. Thus, “the failure of the Consensus reform policies lies in the fact that 
they provided support for the „destruction‟ of inefficient domestic industry, but failed 
to provide support for the „creative‟ phase of „creative destruction‟ of a real 
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transformation of the productive structure through higher investment and 
technological innovation.” (Kregel 2008) 
In sum, in our current context two observations are key: First, whatever its intellectual 
roots and its current health, the Washington Consensus became essentially the vehicle 
delivering the techno-economic paradigm change globally. Second, the main policy 
vehicles of the Consensus– such as financial globalization and FDI-based growth 
policies – have failed to deliver growth and instead magnify the negative effects of 
the ICT paradigm. In combination, both have huge impact on the way innovation 
takes place in many companies, especially in developing countries and poorer regions, 
and the way most countries see and define the policy space available to them.  
Washington Consensus policies were highly effective in destroying admittedly 
outdated industrial capacities in the developing world, yet they were also similarly 
spectacularly ineffective in creating new capabilities and opportunities. Two poster 
countries for globalization, China and India, that together account for large part of 
developing country growth and poverty reduction, are also two distinct exceptions to 
rule as neither followed the Consensus policies as diligently as did many others. 
The conclusions one can draw from this are mainly twofold: First, financial 
globalization in terms of capital account liberalization and increased reliance on 
foreign direct investments (FDI) have little correlation with actual sustained growth 
(see Rodrik and Subramanian 2008 summary of empirical studies and evidence); as 
argued above, FDI seems to create increasingly enclave economies. Second, emphasis 
on macro-economic stability has allowed for unprecedented growth in consumer 
spending and foreign private lending creating „Minsky moments‟ of financial fragility 
in many developing countries in recent decades. (Minsky 1982 and 2008; Kregel 
2004)  
In addition, many of the successful industrial policy tools of the mass-production 
paradigm – state-led industrialization or import substitution industrialization – have 
been discredited and become politically tainted because of the Washington 
Consensus.  
In sum, the international policy environment the Washington Consensus has created is 
a highly fertile ground for the negative effects of the techno-economic paradigm 
change to come into full force without counterbalancing it by domestic or 
international policy initiatives. We argue below that these effects are significantly 
compounded by innovation policies enacted in many developing countries, most 
notably in LA and CEE. These policies misunderstand the nature of restructuring that 
has taken place in CEE and LA. 
III. 3 Innovation Policies in LA and CEE 
The rise of China and India as key global players  
 
is transforming current global patterns of technology generation and control. Multinationals 
outsourcing strategies are no longer merely based on existing comparative advantages of host 
countries. Alongside outsourcing of pure assembling activities, following the maquiladora 
pattern, multinationals are growingly expanding and internationalizing research and 
development activities in order to keep up with boosting demand for new technologies of 
emerging and dynamic future markets where adequate scientific and technological 
infrastructure, including the supply of qualified human resources exist. … On the one hand 
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rising China has the potential to wipe out the bulk of Mexican and Central America 
manufacturing exporting activities, i.e. the maquila industries (as it is currently happening), 
and on the other hand, the increasing tendency to outsource research and development to 
emerging markets may generate adverse incentives to carry out science and technology 
activities in the region, thus further underpinning regional backwardness in terms of 
technological upgrading potentialities. (Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi 2005, 12) 
 
To fully be able to reap any benefits from international division of labor, CEE and LA 
countries need “effective national innovation systems that enable recipient economy 
to retain potential emerging benefits, to promote high level human capital formation 
on a continuum basis, to strategically manage intellectual property rights systems and 
to own capabilities of mastering physical and cultural distances with headquarters.” 
(Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi 2005, 13) This, in brief, is what respective innovation 
policies should aim at. However, as we will show in this section, both LA and CEE 
have not tackled these challenges in their innovation policies over the last decade. 
While there are significant historical differences between CEE and LA, we argue that 
in both regions there was a convergence of innovation policy „best practice‟ during 
1990s. Table 2 summarizes the switch from one policy model to the other, currently 
prevailing one. 
Table 2. Changes in innovation policy models. 
 
Source: Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi 2005, 16. 
While 1980s could be characterized both in CEE and LA as innovation policy models 
where state‟s role in science, technology and R&D was highly important and central, 
it is clear that Soviet innovation policy was certainly more extreme in this model as it 
lacked market mechanisms and private initiative. The linear supply model, prevailing 
until the 1990s, is both highly hierarchical and deeply linear in its understanding of 
innovation: in this model, the latter thrive because of scientific discoveries and 
advance. The key change shaping in late 1990s both in CEE and LA innovation 
policies is the switch toward market-based approach in a sense of both emphasis on 
competitive grants system as a organizational form of how funding agencies work and 
also in the sense of almost complete reliance on private sector initiative. The focus on 
few and large endeavors is replaced by a horizontal perspective and incentive based 
mechanisms rather than command and control are put into practice. Nonetheless, it is 
important to notice that both models persist in conceiving innovation as a linear 
process; the former inducing to an overlap of the concepts of innovation and 
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information accessibility, and the latter supposing that technological dynamism is 
merely confined in the private and business sector domain.  
 
In the linear supply model, knowledge and innovation were supposed to flow from 
government and public institutions (supply-side) to the productive apparatus 
(demand-side). The theoretical background of these science and technology policies 
derived from the assumption that knowledge was a public good, i.e. non rival and non 
excludable in consumption. From this perspective, government and public agencies 
were natural knowledge providers. Knowledge was supposed to naturally flow and 
circulate among economic agents once it had been slotted in the economic system by 
public institutions. In other words, there was a strong belief that scientific progress 
would automatically turn into technological innovation. 
 
Starting from the nineties, the demand for technology became the main criteria in the 
definition of policy priorities and allocation of resources. The faith in market 
mechanisms resulted in neutral and horizontal policies planned to minimize state 
interference with market behavior. Main concerns were favoring of technology 
transfers, investments in quality and efficiency and the provision of technological 
services following a logic of “commercialization” of knowledge and technology 
(ECLAC 2004; Casalet 2003; Jaramillo 2003; Pacheco 2003; Vargas Alfaro and 
Segura Bonilla 2003; Yoguel 2003; Radosevic and Reid 2006; Tiits et al 2008) Such 
approach mimics in many ways innovation policies in developed countries and is 
often theoretically justified with market failure approach. (See, for instance, Rodrik 
2007)  
 
III.3.1 Innovation Policy in LA
19
 
During the import substitution phase a linear supply model of technology policy 
prevailed. The research and development activities were mainly carried out by big 
public enterprises operating in strategic sectors like telecommunications and 
transport, and by public research institutes and universities working in the areas of 
agriculture, energy, mining, forestry and aeronautical, among others, thus manifestly 
following an selective industrial approach (ECLAC 2004). According to 
governmental priorities Latin American countries, especially the larger ones, started 
to build up research institutes and commissions in strategic sectors. In Argentina, for 
instance, the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) was set up in 1954, 
followed by the National Institute of Industrial Technology (INTI) and the National 
Institute of Agricultural Technology (INTA) in 1957. Both were responsible for the 
provision of technology services (Yoguel 2003). Correspondingly, in Mexico the 
National Institute for Nuclear Research (ININ), the Electrical Research Institute (IIE), 
the Mexican Institute of Water Technology (IMTA) and the Mexican Petroleum 
Institute (IMP) were set up to promote technological innovation and development in 
the respective industries (Casalet 2003; ECLAC 2004). Consistently with a selective 
industrial focus, Brazil created a series of sectoral institutions. In the early fifties was 
established the Aerospace Technology Centre (CTA), while almost twenty years later, 
in 1973, was set up the Agricultural Research Enterprise (EMBRAPA). (See also 
Burlamaqui et al 2007) 
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According to the predominant logic of state intervention as an engine of growth, 
many public enterprises established their own research centers like ELETROBRAS‟ 
Electrical Energy Research Centre (CEPEL) and the Leopoldo Américo M. de Mello 
Research and Development Centre (CENPES) run by PETROBRAS (ECLAC 2004;  
Pacheco 2003). 
 
The linear supply model contributed to the creation of S&T infrastructure, thus 
seeding into the basis for future technological upgrading. At the same time, the model 
was weak in coordinating different sectoral agencies leading to overlapping initiatives 
and consequent waste of resources (Capdevielle, Casalet and Cimoli 2000; ECLAC 
2004; Yoguel 2003) 
 
The linear supply model of science and technology policy came to an end with the 
structural reforms and a new and different model slowly emerged. Indeed, in the first 
years of the structural reforms the room for science and technology policy 
interventions shrank. During the initial years of reforms, S&T policy was simply 
marginalized in the management of economic policy. Slowly a change in perspective 
emerged and market mechanisms became the basic reference behind priority setting 
and resource allocation. S&T policies became neutral and horizontal in nature thus 
losing their previous selective makeup.  
 
The science and technology policy model of the nineties emphasized the role of 
markets incentives and of demand side in priority setting. The support for 
technological upgrading and private sector innovation focused on areas where 
perceived market failures occurred; i.e. public policies priority was merely correcting 
information asymmetries between economic agents. This stance towards public 
policies meant placing knowledge and innovation on an equal footing with 
information accessibility. In effect, a conceptual linearity associated with the process 
of knowledge generation and technology diffusion persisted. Knowledge was 
supposed to follow bottom-up non-hierarchical pattern, in a setting where the key 
engine for innovation and knowledge generation is the autonomous initiative of the 
private sector expressing demands as a major technology booster (Cimoli and Primi 
2004).   
 
The shift towards the linear demand model of technology policy entailed institutional 
and organizational changes. The reorganization of the S&T institutional architecture 
brought about modification of domain areas and management styles of existing 
institutions as well as the creation of new institutional bodies. In Argentina, for 
instance, the restructuring of S&T institutional infrastructure led to an increase in 
coordination among different bodies, partly overcoming what represented a structural 
limit of the previous period. In Mexico, in turn, the priority was the decentralization 
of S&T institutional management, according to the different technological and 
specialization patterns of various Mexican regions.  
 
Beyond countries‟ peculiarities, the reorganization of institutions generally brought 
about:   
i) increments in resources and in the relevance of those S&T agencies dedicated to 
capture private sector demand for technology and knowledge, ii) an incipient interest 
towards greater articulation and coordination between private and public sector, 
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resulting in cross-countries augmented interest in universities-enterprises connections 
and, iii) changes in competencies and objectives of agencies. S&T priorities shifted 
from basic research to the provision and commercialization of technological services, 
mainly oriented to support production process management and quality control. 
Reward systems and management styles of S&T institutions changed as well, moving 
towards practices that are more in line with market mechanisms and incentive 
schemes, privileging performance based models of evaluation and allocation of 
priorities. Accordingly, the role of international financial institutions as source of 
financing for S&T augmented. 
 
III.3.2 Innovation Policy in CEE
20
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, as we have argued above, the industry 
collapsed in many CEE countries and many S&T institutions experienced rapid 
decline in funding that led to collapse of academy of sciences system where research 
was not at universities but in specialized academy institutes. (See, e.g., Dobbins 2007) 
In innovation policy, we can detect three more or less distinct phases after the fall of 
Berlin Wall: First, early to mid 1990s are characterized by a clear lack of any policy 
initiatives in CEE, market-led reforms of economic restructuring were seen as the 
main innovation policy vehicles. Second, with opening of the accession talks with the 
European Union, CEE countries started to harmonize their legal and institutional 
infrastructure with the EU‟s acquis communautaire that led to significant changes in 
standardization (food and safety regulations etc) and thus spurred upgrading in many 
sectors. And third, with the beginning of EU‟s financial help (through such funding 
mechanisms as PHARE and pre-structural funds and later, from 2004 onwards, EU‟s 
structural funding) and largely because of EU‟s pressure, all CEE countries started to 
develop innovation policy strategies and increasingly also agencies (Radosevic and 
Reid 2006 offer a very good overview).
21
 
Havlik et al. (2001) demonstrate that the adoption of the EU acquis communautaire 
has had a much stronger impact on the modernization of CEE industry than official 
(often rudimentary) innovation policy during 1990s. Here, we see essentially a form 
of „„unconscious innovation policy‟‟, whereby, with the introduction of new 
regulation, the industry is forced to choose whether to modernize their products and 
production facilities rather drastically, to subject themselves to mergers with bigger 
players with greater economies of scale, or to close down altogether. However, it is 
important to note that such harmonization with Western European standards made 
outsourcing and relocation of production much easier. (See Tiits et al 2008, 76-77) 
 
Similarly to LA, innovation and R&D policies emerging in CEE in late 1990s and in 
particular with looming EU accession in early 2000s, were rife with linear 
understanding of innovation and often in a rather mystified way. Innovation was seen 
as something close to science and invention, and that there is a more or less linear 
correspondence between scientific discovery and high innovation performance; and 
that innovations behave like Nokia‟s mobile phones and thus search for the latter 
became the holy grail of CEE innovation policy. Thus, and again similarly to LA, 
CEE innovation policies tend to concentrate on high technology sectors, on 
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commercializing university research, technology parks for start ups etc. This is best 
reflected in policy measures that allocate the pre-structural and structural funds from 
the EU (in many cases this is the main funding source of innovation in CEE, indeed it 
can be argued that it has crowded out local funding as budgetary constraints and tax 
cuts are followed through; see Radosevic and Reid 2006 and Kattel and Suurna 2008 
for the summary main strategic documents and policy measures). Existing policy 
measures and implementation agencies are rife with coordination problems (both 
within the public sector and between the public sector and private sector actors and 
education and S&T institutions). 
However, particularly since mid 2000s there is a mild change towards including 
existing (low/mid-technology and outsourcing) industries into innovation policy 
making. In some countries, for instance Estonia, EU accession triggered a very 
significant policy change which brought innovation policy onto the agenda very 
strongly; in others, for instance in Slovenia and Hungary, the changes in policy focus 
occurred earlier and were more vocal. However, the changes were and are often 
accompanied by relatively little increase in actual funding and, as importantly, by 
relatively little public attention and discussion of policy strategy. The existing case 
studies seem to also reveal that the Regional Innovation Strategy initiatives have had 
an equally limited impact on the economic development of target regions. All in all, 
the policy analysis and strategic planning capacity existing in CEE at the regional 




As we have seen both in LA and CEE innovation policy were in the early and mid-
1990s plagued by what could be termed as a misunderstanding of innovation as 
something normatively and economically always positive. It is of course true that 
successful introduction of new products and services allows an enterprise with a 
relatively strong market position to sustain and strengthen its competitive position by 
commanding higher prices in a specific market. Yet since Hans Singer‟s (1950) work, 
it is quite clear that innovation can also have a negative impact, especially when one 
operates in a sub-contracting or services industry facing severe cost competition and 
diminishing returns. Particularly in agriculture and simpler services, innovation is 
often an emulation of competitors (e.g. using similar machinery) or a process readily 
available to all (e.g. ICT in hotel industry). These bring lower prices to consumers, 
but also a so-called „„commodity hell‟‟ to many companies, to their wages and profits. 
This – essentially creative destruction management (Drechsler et al 2006) – was not at 
all heeded in innovation policies of LA and CEE in 1990s and 2000s. This lack was 
compounded by the decade long and still continuing „celebration‟ of the industrial 
restructuring delivered through Washington Consensus policies. Indeed, few policy 
makers have realized what are the real consequences of the industrial structuring of 
CEE and LA countries. 
Figure 16 summarizes the stylized facts and key trends and policies in CEE and LA 
over the last decade and a half. 




Source: Authors‟ elaboration. 
It is important to note how techno-economic paradigm („common sense‟ how 
knowledge is created, organized and managed in companies) and the global 
macroeconomic environment created by the Washington Consensus policies are two 
key variables shaping what kind of companies thrive in the periphery and what kind 
of innovation takes place in many of these companies and, in sum, how both these 
developments impact local educational, R&D, S&T etc environment. 
It is also important to note that many innovation and industrial policies actually 
enacted in LA and CEE deal with only fraction of the existing companies as the 
policies tend have a strong high-tech bias. At the same time, high technology is key 
characteristic of most sectors in LA and CEE. 
In sum, both LA and CEE innovation realities and policies are characterized by 
following trends: first, the actual industrial restructuring and upgrading are driven by 
integration into wealthier economic areas (NAFTA and the EU, respectively) mainly 
through outsourcing; second, Nokiafication or high-tech bias of R&D policies that is 
based on linear understanding of innovation that assumes that the main goal for 
innovation policy is to find the one killer application a la Nokia is for Finland; third, 
main problems that both LA and CEE fail to address are: very weak networking 
within and between economic sectors, higher education and research; deficient policy 
design and administrative capacity that leads to coordination problems; and lack of 
actual industrial policies. (See also Guiliani et al 2004; Radosevic and Reid 2006) In 
sum, both CEE and LA have been unable to embed their economies into political and 
institutional framework (see also McDermott 2002) and thus both are largely 
influenced by global macroeconomic environment and have little impact on local 
developments through their own policies. 
We have argued that in many CEE countries there are strong changes towards more 
active role of the state in developing the existing industry since the EU accession; 
these changes are often taking place in discussion with the EU officials rather in local 
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policy debates. However, more importantly, both LA and CEE innovation and 
industrial policy changes take place in macroeconomic policy environment that has 
not really changed since early 1990s. This environment is still based on the 
assumption that most of the industrial change that took place in 1990s in LA and CEE 
brought much better competitiveness to most countries and that the reasons lay in 
neoliberal policies that should be reinforced: lower taxes, balanced budget, lower 
inflation to lure more FDI to generate more exports. In fact, if we take into account 
the nature of industrial change described above, especially many CEE economies are 
close to high financial fragility. This means that LA and CEE countries need to not 
only rethink and reinforce role of the state and public funding in innovation and 
industrial policies, but moreover also in macroeconomic policy sphere. 
IV Conclusion 
The main conclusions of the paper are: 
1) Given the way globalization negatively impacts both developing and 
developed countries, there is a clear need for some sort of reshuffling of the 
global rules of the game, that is global policy solutions. These solutions 
should enable creative destruction management (see further Kattel and Kalvet 
2006b) both in the core and the periphery. For this to take place, developing 
countries need actively to engage in industrial policies. While this is not a 
novel insight (see, for instance also Reinert 2007, Rodrick 2007), we argue 
that current innovation and industrial policies in the developing countries such 
LA and CEE are in many cases outright counterproductive to their and global 
development. 
2) It remains quite unclear how to target (with what policies and what kind of 
administrative and management set-up) networking and diversification in the 
periphery. However, from the LA and CEE experience in 1990s and 2000s it 
seems quite clear that innovation and industrial policies need to be 1) based on 
sector specific approach, 2) aim to create balance between home and foreign 
markets in terms of target markets, investments and also management. 
References 
Amsden, Alice. 2007. Escape from Empire. The Developing World’s Journey 
Through Heaven and Hell. Cambridge, MA / London: The MIT Press. 
Bergson, Abram. 1978. Productivity and the Social System – The USSR and the West. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Berliner, Joseph S. 1976. The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Burlamaqui, Leonardo, Jose A. P. de Souza and Nelson H. Barbosa-Filho. 2007. “The 
rise and halt of economic development in Brazil, 1945-2004: Industrial 
catching-up, institutional innovation, and financial fragility.” In Ha-Joon 
Chang, ed., Institutional Change and Economic Development. London: 
Anthem, 239-259. 
Casalet, M. 2003. “Políticas científicas y tecnológicas en México: evaluación e 
impacto”, FLACSO, sede México.  
Capdevielle, M., M. Casalet and Mario Cimoli. 2000. “Sistema de innovación: el caso 
mexicano”, Proyecto Instituciones y mercados, Comisión Económica para 




Chang, Ha-Joon. 2007. Bad Samaritans. Rich Nations, Poor Policies & the Threat to 
the Developing World. London: Random House. 
Cimoli, Mario, ed. 2000. Developing innovation system: Mexico in the global context. 
New York-London: Continuum-Pinter Publishers. 
Cimoli, Mario and J. Katz. 2003. “Structural reforms, technological gaps and 
economic development: a Latin American perspective”, in Industrial and 
Corporate Change, 12, 2, **-**. 
Cimoli, Mario and Annalisa Primi. 2004. “Las políticas tecnológicas para la creación 
y difusión del conocimiento en América Latina y el Caribe”, mimeo, División 
de Desarrollo Productivo y Empresarial, CEPAL. 
Cimoli, Mario, João Carlos Ferraz and Annalisa Primi. 2005. Science and technology  
policies in open economies:  The case of Latin America and the Caribbean. Santiago: 
ECLAC, available at www.cepal.org.  
Drechsler, W., Backhaus, J.G., Burlamaqui, L., Chang, H.-J., Kalvet, T., Kattel, R., 
Kregal, J., and Reinent, E.S. 2006. “Creative destruction management in 
Central and Eastern Europe: meeting the challenges of the techno-economic 
paradigm shift.” In T. Kalvet and R. Kattel, eds., Creative destruction 
management: meeting the challenges of the techno-economic paradigm shift. 
Tallinn: PRAXIS Center for Policy Studies, 15-30. 
Dobbins, M. 2007. “Comparing higher education policies in central and Eastern 
Europe”, Working Paper ECPR Joint Session, Helsinki, Finland. 
ECLAC. 2004. Productive development in open economies, LC/G.2234(SES.30/3, 
Santiago, Chile. 
European Innovation Scoreboard. 2006. Available from: http://www.proinno-
europe.eu/doc/EIS2006_final.pdf. 
Fitch. 2007a. Risks rising in the Baltic States? Special report, 6 March.  
Fitch. 2007b. Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania – how sustainable are external 
imbalances? Special report, 20 March.  
Fitch. 2007c. The Baltic states: risks rising in the trailblazers of emerging Europe? 
Special report, 8 June. 
Frost, A and M. Weinstein.  1998. “ABB Poland.” Richard Ivey School of Business. 
The University of Ontario. 
Gallagher, Kevin P. and Lyuba Zarsky. 2007. The Enclave Economy. Foreign 
Investment and Sustainable Development in Mexico’s Silicon Valley. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT press. 
Gerardo Bracho C. and Julio López G. 2005. The Economic Collapse of Russia, 
available at networkideas.org. 
Giuliani, Elisa, Carlo Pietrobelli and Roberta Rabellotti. 2005. “Upgrading in Global 
Value Chains: Lessons from Latin American Clusters.” World Development, 
33, 4, April, 549-573. 
Havlik, P., Landesmann, M., Stehrer. R., Römisch, R., and Gilsätter, B. 2001. 
Competitiveness of industry in CEE candidate countries: composite paper. 
Vienna: Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies.  
Jaramillo Salazar, H. 2003. “Políticas científicas y tecnológicas en Colombia: 
evaluación e impacto durante la década de los noventa”, Trabajo realizado 
para la CEPAL, Bogotá, Colombia. 
Kattel, R. and Kalvet, T. 2006a. Knowledge-based economy and ICT-related 
education: overview of the current situation and challenges for the education 
system. Tallinn: PRAXIS Center for Policy Studies. 
 
 28 
Kattel, Rainer and Tarmo Kalvet, eds. 2006b. Creative Destruction Management: 
Meeting the Challenges of the Techno-Economic Paradigm Shift. Praxis 
Center for Policy Studies, Tallinn. 
Kattel, Rainer and Margit Suurna. 2008. “Europeanization of Innovation Policy in 
Central and Eastern Europe.” Paper prepared for EGPA 2008 conference; 
manuscript. 
Kattel, Rainer, Tarmo Kalvet and Tiina Randma-Liiv. 2009. “Small States and 
Innovation.” In Robert Steinmetz, Baldur Thorhallsson and Anders Wivel, 
eds., Small States inside and outside the European Union: The Lisbon Treaty 
and Beyond, publisher tbc, forthcoming. 
Kosta, Jiri. 2005. Die tschechische/tschechoslowakische Wirtschaft im mehrfachen 
Wandel, Münster: LIT Verlag. 
Kovacs, Janos Matyas and Marton Tardos, eds. 1992. Reform and Transformation in 
Eastern Europe, London and New York: Routledge. 
Kregel, J. E. Matzner, G. Grabber. (1992. The Market Shock. An AGENDA for the 
Economic and Social Reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe. Austrian 
Academy of Sciences / International Institute for Peace, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Kregel, Jan A. 1999. “Currency stabilization through full employment: Can EMU 
combine price stability with employment and income growth?” Eastern 
Economic Journal, 25, 1, 35-47. 
Kregel, J., 2004. “External financing for development and international financial 
instability.” G-24 Discussion Paper Series, United Nations. Available from: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2420048_en.pdf.    
Kregel, J. A. 2008. “The Discrete Charm of the Washington Consensus.” The Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper No 533. Available at 
http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp_533.pdf.  
Krugman, Paul. 2008. “Trade and Wage, Reconsidered”, available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~pkrugman/pk-bpea-draft.pdf. 
Lorenz, Edward and Bengt-Åke Lundvall, eds. 2006. How Europe’s Economies 
Learn, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Euro-Coop. 2007. Report about data collection in the partner regions. Available at 
http://www.iccr-international.org/euro-coop/.  
Margolius, Ivan and Charles Meisl. 1992.  Skoda, London: Osprey. 
McDermott, Gerald A. 2002. Embedded Politics. Industrial Networks and 
Institutional Change in Postcommunism. Ann Arbor:University of Michigan 
Press. 
McDermott, Gerald A. 2005. “The Politics of Institutional Renovation and Economic 
Upgrading: Lessons from the Argentine Wine Industry”, available at 
http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/mcdermott/files/McDermott-PS-
10-06.pdf.  
Minsky, Hyman P. 1982. Can ‘It’ Happen Again? Essays on Instability and Finance. 
New York: Sharpe. 
Minsky, Hyman P. 2008. Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New York: McGraw/Hill. 
Mortimore, M and Peres, W. 2001. “La competitividad empresarial en América 
Latina y el Caribe”, revista de la CEPAL, n. 4, agosto 2001. 
Nurkse, Ragnar. 1961. Equilibrium and Growth in the World Economy. Gottfried 
Haberler and Robert M. Stern, eds., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Pacheco, C. 2003. “As reformas da Política Nacional de Ciência Tecnologia e 
 
 29 
inovaçao no Brasil, 1999- 2002”, Trabajo realizado para la CEPAL, 
Campinas, Brasil. 
Palma, Jose Gabriel. 2005. “The seven main „stylized facts‟ of the Mexican economy 
since trade liberalization and NAFTA,” Industrial and Corporate Change, 14, 
6, 941-991. 
Perez, Carlota. 2002. Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The 
Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Perez, Carlota. 2004. “Technological Revolutions, Paradigm Shifts and 
Socioinstitutional Change”, in E.S. Reinert (ed.), Globalization, Economic 
Development and Inequality: An Alternative Perspective, Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, pp. 217-242. 
Perez, Carlota. 2006. “Respecialisation and the deployment of the ICT paradigm: An 
essay on the present challenges of globalization”, in Compañó et al. (eds.), 
The Future of the Information Society in Europe: Contributions to the debate, 
Seville, Spain, European Commission, Directorate General Joint Research 
Centre.   
Pisani-Ferry, Jean, Philippe Aghion, Marek Belka, Jürgen von Hagen, Lars 
Heikensten and Andre Sapir. 2008. Coming of age: Report on the euro area. 
Bruegel Blueprint Series. Available http://www.bruegel.org/6062.  
Prahalad, C. K. 2006. “The Innovation Sandbox”, strategy+business, available at 
http://www.strategy-business.com/press/freearticle/06306.  
Radosevic, S. and D.E. Yoruk. 2001. Videoton: The growth of enterprise through 
entrepreneurship and network alignment, University College London, Center 
for the Study of Economic and Social Change in Europe, Working Paper No. 
3. 
Radosevic, Slavo and Alastair Reid. 2006. “Innovation Policy for a Knowledge-based 
Economy in Central and Eastern Europe: Driver of Growth or New Layer of 
Bureaucracy?” In K. Piech and S. Radosevic (eds.), Knowledge-Based 
Economy in Central and East European Countries: Countries and Industries 
in a Process of Change, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 295-311. 
Reinhardt, N. and Peres, W. 2000. “Latin America‟s new economic model: micro 
responses and economic restructuring”, World Development, 28(9). 
Reinert, Erik S. 1980. International Trade and the Economic Mechanisms of 
Underdevelopment, Cornell University PhD thesis. 
Reinert, Erik S.  2007. How Rich Countries Got Rich . . . and Why Poor Countries 
Stay Poor, London: Constable. 
Erik S. Reinert, Yves Ekoué Amaïzo and Rainer Kattel, The Economics of Failed, 
Failing and Fragile States: Productive Structure as the Missing Link. 2008. 
The Other Canon Foundation and Tallinn University of Technology Working 
Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics, forthcoming. 
Reinert, Erik S. and Rainer Kattel. 2007. “European Eastern Enlargement as Europe‟s 
Attempted Economic Suicide?” The Other Canon and Tallinn University of 
Technology Working Papers in Technology Governance and Economic 
Dynamics, no 14. 
Rodrick, Dani. 2007. One Economics, Many Recipes. Globalization, Institutions, and 
Economic Growth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Rodrick, Dani and Arvind Subramanian. 2008. “Why did Financial Globalization 





Samuelson, Paul A. 2004. “Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of 
Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 18, 3, 135-146. 
Skidelsky, Robert. 2008. “Gloomy about Globalization”. New York Review of Books, 
55, 6, April 17, 2008, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21259.  
Singer, H., 1950. “The distribution of gains between investing and borrowing 
countries.” American economic review, 40 (2), 473�485. 
Stokes, Raymond G. 2000. Constructing Socialism. Technology and Change in East 
Germany 1945-1990, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Tiits, Marek, Rainer Kattel, Tarmo Kalvet and Dorel Tamm. 2008. “Catching up, 
forging ahead or falling behind? Central and Eastern European development in 
1990-2005,” Innovation. The European Journal of Social Science Research, 
21, 1, 65-85.  
UNCTAD. 2004. Development and Globalization: Facts and Figures, New York and 
Geneva. 
Vargas Alfaro, L. and Segura Bonillla, O. 2003. “Políticas industriales, científicas y 
tecnológicas en Costa Rica y Centro América”, Centro Internacional en 
Política Económica para el Desarrollo Sostenible (CINPE), Universidad 
nacional, Hereida, Costa Rica. 
Williamson, J. 2002 (1990). What Washington Means by Policy Reform. Available at 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=486.  
World Bank. 2006. Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of 
Reform. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Yoguel, G. 2003. “La política científica y tecnológica argentina en las últimas 
décadas: algunas consideraciones desde la perspectiva del desarrollo de 
procesos de aprendizaje”, Trabajo realizado para la CEPAL, Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. 
Young, A. 1994. “Gerber Products Company: Investing in the New Poland.” Harvard 
Business School case study. 
 
 
 
